Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) - حكومة الوفاق الوطني


At the end the horrified HoR was forced by imposed circumstances to take part in the dialogue with the expired GNC in order to achieve peace in the country. A study modelling a legislative intervention to reduce artificial TFA to 0. Instead they received a reply from "them" stating that the Berbers are in fact being represented at the Skhirat talks. The EU was reported to have said that they have learned the lessons from their Libya foray , while other powers simply scoffed the " Libya expedition " as an " unintended mistake ". This indicates that the PC itself must be replaced.

الترقيات قرار رقم لسنه تخصصي - [PDF Document]

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قرار 42 لسنة 2015 pdf. The international support for the so-called "moderate rebels" or "moderate opposition", or "moderate militants" as well as their wide support for the Muslim Brotherhood was openly announced by a number of world leaders.

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قرار 42 لسنة 2015 pdf

Thumbnail Fig. Here we estimate the potential reductions in annual CHD events, disability-adjusted life years DALYs and associated health-care costs attributable to reductions in artificial TFAs in the diet. The main inputs of the policy model for the analysis were: i the estimated baseline intake of TFAs before ; ii the types of alternative oils and fats used to replace TFAs; iii the effects of the improvements in plasma lipid profile on CHD risks and iv the health-care costs and DALYs saved due to averted fatal and nonfatal CHD events.

Because TFAs cannot be replaced on a basis with other specific fatty acids, the unit of replacement was partially hydrogenated vegetable oils comprised of various fatty acids, including TFAs. Thus, we evaluated both the total partially hydrogenated vegetable oils consumed and the usual proportion of TFAs in partially hydrogenated vegetable oils during Our search was complemented by a consensus meeting of local experts and decision-makers including officials from the Ministry of Health, epidemiologists, nutritionists, cardiologists and food engineers closely involved with the oils' and fats' suppliers of TFA replacements.

They identified key estimates for the model, including the baseline intake of TFA, the proportion of TFA from ruminants and the replacement fats used by industry. Our central estimate of baseline TFA consumption in was 1. The most common replacement oil was sunflower oil with high-oleic acid content base case estimate Improvements in the plasma lipid profile were expected to result in improvements in CHD risks.

We assessed the relevant changes in plasma lipid profiles and other biomarkers of CHD risk based on meta-analyses of controlled dietary feeding trials.

These estimates were used to drive projections of CHD risks, as outlined below. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh; We used individual level data on CHD risk factors from a national prospective cohort study. Int J Cardiol.

We combined these results with demographic data for Argentina using the census to create a national CHD risk profile. According to the consensus of our expert panel, between and , most of the partially hydrogenated vegetable oils in the diet were replaced by healthier fats. A prospective study of cholesterol, apolipoproteins, and the risk of myocardial infarction.. N Engl J Med Aug 8; 6 We estimated the annual number of deaths caused by CHD using national mortality statistics for Buenos Aires: Ministry of Health; Sudden cardiac death caused by coronary heart disease.

We increased the number of CHD deaths by Assessing the global burden of ischemic heart disease, part 2: analytic methods and estimates of the global epidemiology of ischemic heart disease in Glob Heart. The difference in CHD risk predicted by the cardiovascular risk calculator was calibrated to the annual mortality from CHD.

We also assumed that the difference in 10 year-CHD risk was equally distributed in each year of the decade , by age and sex. For acute coronary syndrome, we used one-third of the case-fatality rate of acute myocardial infarctions, according to local sources. Clinical predictors of in-hospital prognosis in unstable angina: ECLA 3. Am Heart J. All values were calibrated by age-sex hospital case-fatality rate in Argentina, obtained from the national hospital discharge registry for the public sector.

Base de datos de egresos hospitalarios. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Salud; Understanding DALYs disability-adjusted life years. J Health Econ. Briefly, YLL were calculated from national health statistics as the difference between local life expectancy and age at death. Disability weights for acute myocardial infarctions and acute coronary syndrome were considered equal.

Common values in assessing health outcomes from disease and injury: disability weights measurement study for the Global Burden of Disease Study Geneva: World Health Organization; Cost inputs for the model were costs of acute CHD events, their follow-up and programmatic costs.

A micro-costing approach was undertaken considering a health system perspective. Rev Argent Cardiol. Higa C y colab. Resultados de las Encuestas SAC.. Rev Argent Cardiol ; Rev Argent Cardiol ;81 5 Rev Argent Cardiol ;75 5 Economic evaluation guidelines in Latin America: a current snapshot. Expert Rev Pharmacoecon Outcomes Res. Finally, costs borne by the Ministry of Health for the implementation of annual surveillance and monitoring of the compliance of the industry with the regulations were also estimated, and included costs of personnel, food analysis, and onsite training at food companies Daniel Ferrante, Ministry of Health, personal communication, All costs were converted to United States dollars, corresponding to the exchange rate of Tipo de Cambio; To evaluate parameter uncertainty, we performed sensitivity analyses according to established guidelines.

Med Decis Making. A deterministic sensitivity analysis was first performed to evaluate the uncertainty related to specific parameters and their relative importance, depicted in a tornado analysis Fig.

Ranges used for the parameters were extracted from the published literature or expert opinions. To assess global uncertainty, a probabilistic sensitivity analysis was performed, incorporating the main parameters and their distributions. Federal Law No.

ISO School Buses. UAE Standards. Measurement systems. Water Heaters. Chicken EXP. Taxi meters. Organic Food. Medical measuring instruments. Lubricating Oil. Speed Limiter for Vehicles. Drinking Water. Plastic Bags. Gas Cylinder. Halal Products. UAE Standarts. Regulation of Slaughterhouses Abattoirs Registration procedures. UAE Standard. Technical regulation for the Legal metrology activates. Emirati system for the control of honey. They had also rejected any foreign intervention in Libya, specifically denouncing any foreign military force to protect the UN-appointed government, and hence the name of the bloc.

To clarify the matter it must be noted that there are two Article 8 in the same agreement. The second is Article 8 of the " Additional Provisions " found in page 20 of the agreement , which states that: " All powers of the senior military, civil and security posts stipulated in the Libyan legislations and laws in force shall be transferred to the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers immediately upon signing this Agreement ". It is understandable to object to this article especially knowing that it was added to the draft agreement after it was re-opened for changes in violation of the signed draft agreement.

Hover it is unclear why the Cyrenaican members of the council were still asking for guarantees to keep the army and its leadership as it is when the first Article 8 of the main agreement found in page 8 clearly states that the presidency council shall assume " the functions of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan army ".

Surely the only way to guarantee the army's integrity to remain untouched is to not agree to Article 8 in the first place. The House of Representatives had conditionally-approved the Libyan Political Agreement by 96 votes out of [44].

The HoR had insisted from the start of the dialogue that the Libyan army and its leadership is a red line; while according to the GNC Haftar's war against terror in Benghazi is a war against "revolutionaries". However, according to the Libyan political analyst, Mr. Ashraf Alshah, it is illegal to cancel any part of the agreement because the LPA was a complete agreement that does not allow any changes after it was signed by the members who signed it [45]. Sources aligned with the Tripoli government also stated that the HoR has no right to make such decisions without constitutional amendment.

The HoR said they will discuss amending the constitutional declaration on the following day the 26th of January The LPA itself signed on the 17th of December is according to the GNC "illegal" because it was not signed by any authorised GNC members, as noted above; while the HoR members who signed the agreement apparently did so according to their own accord after forming what they called " Bloc 92 " — in reference to the number of HoR members who went on to sign the violated LPA without objecting to Article 8 [46].

In his page report Mr. The PC, for example, commenced its duties without constitutional approval as stated by Article 12 of the CD , and established more militias against the agreement including the illegal formation of the so-called "presidential guard" [53]. The violations also include the illegal formation of the HCS as reported at the start of this page.

However, officially speaking, the LPA came to a dead end on the 29th of May after the so-called Paris Conference in which Libyan leaders agreed to hold election on the 10th of December ; thereby abandoning the process of amending the so-called LPA.

Ironically the LPA resulted in the formation of the illegal HCS, yet another political body imposed on the will of the Libyan people by the international community, which was involved in the Paris agreement. This means that the Libyan saga continues to be complicated by foreign interventions that ultimately turn out to be nothing but un-intentional mistakes.

On the 30th day the council made an announcement apologising for asking for a further 48 hours before they can announce their government. The disagreement over the government is noted elsewhere in this page see Decrees and LPA. On the 19th of January the council had finally published its cabinet of 32 ministers under Decree 3 of see Decrees for more on this. This decree was signed by seven members of the council.

The other two members who did not sign the decree are deputy prime minister Ali Algatrani who had previously protested against decree 1 and Mr. Omar Alaswad see LPA for more on this issue. The council has forwarded a copy of the proposed government to the House of Representatives HoR in Tobruk for the HoR members to decided whether to grant it the required vote of confidence or not.

The following government is still pending approval by the House of Representatives HoR. The HoR has ten days to either approve or reject the government. The list is a translation of the Arabic list provided by the Presidency Council's official webpage [1]. Groups representing Libyan women have already rejected the government which they said is formed by a council made entirely of men.

Only two ministries out of 32 were assigned to women: the " Labour " and the Culture ministries. Some Libyans believe countries would perform better were women in charge of the Defence, Justice, Interior and Foreign ministries; at least that way it would be unlikely for them to bomb a sovereign state to smithereens and then turn round and say it was " unintended mistake ".

On the other hand Mr. Omar Alaswad [2], a member of the Presidency Council who had also suspended his membership in protest , said that the announcement of the government is illegal because not all the members of the council were present when the list was decided — a reference to the absence of deputy prime minister Ali Algatrani.

Alaswad even said the posts were divided without consideration of competency. Alaswad also revealed that the agreement was to form only 10 ministries, but then the council had extended this number to 24 ministries, after which he complained to the president regarding the sudden change.

He then added that for some reason and without consultation with all the members of the council the president revealed a government of 32 ministers in the last night before the announcement. In response to this violation the council's president, Mr. Sarraj, said the expanded cabinet came in response to the sensitive period current in the country [3]. The following is a list of the proposed 32 ministries:. Image source: lananews. The House of Representatives had rejected the proposed GNA government of 32 ministers by 89 votes out of votes [4].

The main reason was that the government is too large. The HoR said the Presidency Council has ten days to come up with a smaller government [6].

Regarding the votes required for approving or rejecting the government, HoR member Saleh Abdulnabi said the votes are needed only to grant the vote of confidence which they did not do, adding that rejecting the government does not require such majority [5]. While according to the same source [5] Dr. Alabani said the Constitutional Declaration CD requires half the congress members in the case of the HoR half of plus one, and thus the number of HoR members who attended today's session is more than the legal number required by the CD.

Therefore the following list of ministers and the notes are collected from various Libyan sources including LANA. From the transparency principle the presidency council ought to have a website detailing all their meetings and decrees to inform the Libyans and the world of their activities in order to avoid confusion and unconfirmed information being circulated by rouge sites.

Or maybe they are, like the ousted NTC, have no intention of sharing their activities with the people they claim they represent. The president of the presidency council has proposed his second government on Sunday the 14th of February However, the HoR's president told Libya's Channel [9] that the HoR did not receive the list until the 15th of February , which is a day after the stipulated deadline. The first proposal was rejected by the HoR on the 25th of January This second attempt was trimmed down to 18 ministers 13 ministers and 5 state ministers ; three of whom are women numbered 9, 14, 16 in the following list.

The proposed ministerial government is defined by Decree 4 of see Decrees tab, above. Deputy prime minister, Mr.

Ali Algatrani, was reported by LANA to have said that the reason he suspended his membership from the presidency council for the second time is that the " Brotherhood " is in complete charge of what is going on [7] and that the " brotherhood kitchen " is currently in Skhirat preparing the government:. The second problem is that the proposed government, or Decree 4 of , shows that three council members did not sign the proposal: deputy prime minster Ali Algatrani who has suspend his membership from the council for the second time ; minister Omar Alaswad who had also suspended his membership ; and deputy prime minister Musa Alkuni who was later reported to have signed the document even though his signature does not appear on the document.

Alaswad both did not sign the previously rejected government either. It is not known what this means in relation to the legality of the decree.

Alaswad said according to the same source [ 7 ] that one proposed minister is implicated in or accused of financial corruption, and that the list was shown to them without discussing any of the CV's; concluding that the PC the presidency council will not be able to survive.

Minister of Planning, Dr. Minister of Finance, Mr. Fakher Muftah Buferna, was reported by Libyaschannel [10] to have declined to accept the offer, while stating his surprise when he saw his name in the list, noting that he was never told about his name being included in the proposed government. This indeed is a bizarre behaviour from the presidency council — the exact behaviour exercised by the UN when they first proposed their list of the presidency council on the 17th of December It was reported that the HoR has on Monday invited the president of the presidency council to Tobruk to discuss the proposed government on Tuesday the 16th of February Some HoR members were reported by Libyan media to have said that the HoR intends to pass the second proposal for the sake of Libya but with reservation regarding some ministers, and hence the reason for the invitation to Mr.

However, as of today the 16th of February, Mr. Sarraj requested from the HoR to postpone his appearance before the HoR for one week [8]. Sarraj did not attend the session [12]. Instead Mr. Sarraj was reported by LANA to have arrived in Cairo to discuss " the latest political developments " with Egyptian officials [13]. Download Decree 4 of second proposed GNA government of 18 ministers - part 1. Download Decree 4 of second proposed GNA government of 18 ministers - part 2.

As of today the HoR is yet to approve or reject the above proposed government. Meanwhile the GNA is seemingly operating in the capital Tripoli without approval, and is even recognised by the mostly-dictatorial Arab League to be the only legitimate government in Libya. On the other hand, the spokesman of the Libyan Army, Col. Almesmari, was reported to have warned that the Libyan Army will not allow any GNA ministry to operate from Benghazi without securing the approval from the HoR [14].

It has been five months since the PC proposed its second government and yet the HoR had failed to approve or disapprove the proposed government. It is obvious the HoR had no intention of doing so, citing excuse after another, including HoR members not turning up for work but still get paid.

Temehu's translation: " because of the HoR's inability to convene a session to vote on the accord government, the Presidential Council has issued a mandate to authorise the proposed government of ministers [to commence work] in order to respond to the crises because there is no more time to waste ".

The president had also called for the HoR to fulfil its duty and make a decision on the matter. In a chaotic and live session the HoR had rejected the proposed government of national accord [15].

The HoR had granted the PC ten days to propose its third and final government. Many HoR members were angry about the way the voting was suddenly announced and felt they were cheated.

As far as many MPs are concerned the agenda for today's session contains only two topics:. However, according to the HoR the agenda for the session is the same agenda laid out months ago and that this session is merely an extension to the previously suspended sessions.

This does not make sense since the HoR had repeatedly announced for the last 8 months several agendas for the various sessions taken place since January , and in each of these agendas the topics are different, and therefore to say that the agenda is the same since January is incorrect.

Just watch the above video and you will understand the resulting farce initially imposed on Libya by UN bombs. He also said that the fact that the HoR's president had ordered the PC to form a third government shows that he has no intention of removing the PC itself. The second deputy agreed that the PC has failed and that a new government is required, but he was not happy with the manner in which the HoR conducted this session, which he says would deepen the divide [18].

Other HoR members, however, were reported to have said that the PC has no legitimacy to form a third a government because according to Article the PC has failed twice to form a government [19]. This indicates that the PC itself must be replaced. Many Libyan analysts say the PC's failure to implement the LPA in relation to removing outlaw militias from the capital and instead forming new militias like the Presidential Guard and the Bunyan Marsous was the final nail in the PC's coffin. The twist however is that according to the controversial and NTC-imposed constitutional declaration CD , if the proposed government is rejected twice then the acting president of Libya currently represented by the HoR's president has the right to form a new government.

But instead the HoR had granted the UN-imposed PC a third and final chance to come up with a smaller government some say of 8 ministers within 10 days. This sounds like trouble ahead, once more. The farce continues. The PC also said that the PC and the GNA will continue to function as the only executive authority in Libya until the HoR endorses the proposed government meaning the forthcoming government the PC is intending to form.

Critics said the response was ambiguous and did not address the HoR's rejection with open transparency and clear wording the people they represent can understand. Writing dodgy statements, like the UN's resolutions to bomb Libya that contained hidden agendas the so-called implied objectives deduced by reading two resolutions together , is best avoided. One thing for sure, neither the UN nor any Libyan government is, so far, seem interested in the well being of the impoverished Libyan civilians whose suffering and miseries continues to worsen by the day.

To speak the language of people in the stricken streets, and send the jargon of politicians to the waste bin, one is compelled to say that there is one thing that is puzzling the dizzy minds of Libyans: the number of violations committed by all the governments of Libya and by the UN and other international powers dealing with Libya is truly astronomical.

The Odyssey continues to spew out one violation after another while the people continue to suffer the miseries of sick morality.

Almost every single entity involved had violated one rule or another, right from day one: the imaginary massacre of Benghazi - the WMD of Libya. What does that tell you? Is it a " mistake "? Or is it a hidden agenda to divide Libya on bad terms? Or maybe a bigger agenda to unleash a big war that will consume the poor. For security reasons, they said, they have stationed themselves in a protected military base Bu Setta Naval Base near the seaport.

Apparently, the UN envoy, Mr. Kobler, was reported to have said that the government can commence work in the capital without any approval from the HoR, and to illustrate his point he further added that an ambulance vehicle can be driven or moved without asking for the driver's driving licence [10, 11 ].

Presumably, extending this UN logic, anyone can fly a helicopter through a civilian area without a licence so long as the air ambulance is carrying a sick man! A few days after the PC's arrival in the capital Tripoli the HCS held its first meeting in Tripoli in open violation of the LPA; thereby reflecting the same chaotic start that eventually ruined the NTC, the GNC and the HoR: repeated governments, countless councils, childish reactions, and endless disagreements and foreign interferences that turned Libya into hell.

On the 5th of April some members of the HCS said to be 73 members held their first meeting in the capital Tripoli without approval from the parliament. It was reported that the session was chaired by Abdurhman Alshater — the oldest member in the group [8]. Abdulrahman Alsweihli the president of the HCS with 53 votes , and Salah Almakhzoum as his first deputy with 43 votes [7]. Abdulrahman Alsweihli. To add insult to injury, foreign diplomats, as usual, welcomed the violation by stating that the HCS had amended the Constitutional Declaration CD without authority from the sole legislator in the country the HoR because the HoR had failed to hold a meeting regarding amending the CD in relation to approving the UN-proposed GNA [12].

But then blaming the HoR, which appears to have been infiltrated from the start by some members whose main focus is to fail the HoR, should not be an excuse to justify the popular metaphor: " two wrongs do not make a right ". EU leaders, here, have abandoned the principles for which the whole of Libya was destroyed. One GNC member said the meeting is a " joke " because the required number of attendees is members for any GNC decision to be legal [6].

The number of attendees was said to be 93 members. Ironically, Mr. Alsweihli told Libya TV [11] that he was surprised to see his name voted the president of the HCS without his knowledge, just as the UN did when they included his name in the violated LPA without his knowledge.

Why him in particular and why this happened to him twice remains a mystery only the UN and the GNC can explain. It is obvious that there is some sort of attempt, or a foreign agenda, to yet again derail the whole process of reconciliation and farther drag the country into unspeakable miseries.

A meeting of the HCS, chaired by Mr. In addition to the above-noted shoddy activity and violations of GNC members, some HoR members and other political analysts have already noted that the GNA is controlled by the "Brotherhood" and that they were protected and escorted into the capital Tripoli by the same militias and outlaws who hijacked the capital Tripoli from the HoR in Even Mr.

A few weeks later, the spokesman of the Libyan Army, Col. Ahmed Mesmari, said the Presidential Guard is just a new name for the outlaw militias or the Shields that previously formed by the GNC [13]. The presidential guard is a military unit created by the PC to protect itself while leaving the Libyans wide open to kidnapping and murder. Mesmari also stated that " the international camp and specifically Britain were sponsoring terror groups in Benghazi, Tripoli and other Libyan cities " [13] [Temehu's translation from Arabic].

The international support for the so-called "moderate rebels" or "moderate opposition", or "moderate militants" as well as their wide support for the Muslim Brotherhood was openly announced by a number of world leaders.

In fact in the former president of the GNC, Mr. Nuri Abusahmain, admitted his support for the terror groups currently destroying Benghazi and Darna and even named other GNC members whom he implicated in the program. Seemingly it is a bait they swallowed to destroy everything in the long run, of course, without knowing. There is still time to turn round if they and their masters in Istanbul and Qatar see the light.

The fact that Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other countries including Libya's HoR cut relations with Qatar in because of Qatar's support of terror shows that some of them are beginning to see the light, even though their responses are not what is expected because the tragedy seems to involve dividing the State into two blocks fighting each other government fighting ISIL and Brotherhood , and this seems to have been accomplished by the Saudis and the Egyptians who are currently bombing their follow countries in Yemen, Libya, Syria, etc.

Violence including fighting terror is not the answer. And to further inflame the volatile tragedy, the acting-President of Libya, Mr. Agila Salah the HoR's president , had recently revealed that the conspiracy of "starving Libyans" was created by some Libyans inside Libya with foreign supervision to starve the Libyans in order to impose a particular situation on the Libyan people in which the destiny of Libya would be in the hands of a minority supported by foreign forces.

That is more-or-less the same thing. The acting-President of Libya was also reported to have said that the same people who created the crisis are the ones who are talking about "solving" it in return for imposing themselves as governors of Libya [19; click here for a copy of the statement ].

In relation to this, Libya Herald [15] noted that:. In relation to the above revelations one can recall a number of discrepancies that may lend support to the above claims. To start with the PC entered Tripoli with such ease even before securing approval from the parliament — an achievement the parliament itself the HoR had failed to secure from its exile in Tobruk.

The reason was to avoid "bloodshed" and guard the national unity, it said [4]. However, according to the PMO's website the PM of the salvation government denied the move and warned the PC to stay clear of all the government's official headquarters, as he also instructed his ministers to continue their duties as usual.

The Announcement stated that the PC should wait until a political agreement has been reached between all parties [5,6]. The last news published by the GNC in its official website was dated to the 13 of April — just one week after the formation of the HCS!

The fact that many GNC members turned against the HoR after the election of the HoR and resumed their work in the GNC against the wishes of the Libyan people is more than enough to exclude them from any future government, simply because one would presume the right thing to do is to give full support to the government elected by the Libyan people that is the HoR. But they did not; they were quite happy to join the militias in their coup against legitimacy. The closing of Libya's air space by the GNC a few days before the arrival of the PC, and the arrival of the PC via the sea, and the reported enquiry by PM Ghweil regarding whether the PC will be secular or in support of sharia law [9] appear to be no more than distractions to give the impression that the GNA and the GNC differ in more ways than the last letter A or C.

Hence, the first thing the president of the Presidency Council, Mr. Alsarraj, said when he entered Tripoli is that " sharia law " will be the source of all legislations [3]. This matter should be debated and voted for by the Libyan people.

A few years after the NTC was installed by the UN in former rebel-prime-minister Mahmoud Jibril was reported to have said that the NTC was heavily infiltrated by the Brotherhood from the start; even though it is not known why he did not say that at the start of the UN bombing campaign when he was a prime minister running between Paris and Benghazi securing the bombing of Libya!

Protesters took to the streets of Benghazi and Tripoli condemning the latest violations by defunct GNC members, just as they previously did in regard to the UN violations of the signed agreement on the 17th of December For some reason the Presidency Council is, so far, completely silent over the latest violations.

All in all the same back and forth policy, the " tit for tat " politics that plighted Libya since the UN's bombing campaign was ignited with vengeance, still dominates the Libyan tragedy. Nothing seems mutual; after all, this supposed to be an accord government agreed by all parties, yet it has created more discord and divisions than any other ousted government.

Crime has reportedly increased since the arrival of the PC, including kidnapping and murder, with more power cuts and less cash and far more confusion; ultimately leading to more Libyans being diagnosed with "depression" and "PTSD". As of May the HoR is yet to approve the proposed government; practically resulting in three governments in UN-destroyed Libya.

Yet the Arab League urged its members including tyrant dictators to recognise no Libyan government but the unapproved GNA. This Arab [League] behaviour was condemned by the HoR's president as illegal and unacceptable [16]. The farce continues, while the Libyans starve in the name of foreign protection. It has been five months now since the HCS self-appointed itself, and still there is no official opposition to the illegal appointment - except of course from the exiled HoR.

The self-appointed HCS has today rebelled against legitimacy for the second time and granted itself full power to assume Libya's legislative authority in violation of the so-called Skhirat agreement.

Its first coup was on the 5th of April when they met and amended the CD without approval from the parliament. The Skhirat agreement clearly states that the HoR is the only legislative authority in Libya, and that the HCS is only an advisory council. Apparently the reason, according to the statement made by the president of the HCS [21], is the HoR's failure to hold a session to amend the constitutional declaration and endorse the LPA.

According to the HoR's president [20] the move is a " coup against legitimacy ". The HoR granted the PC 10 days to propose its third and last government.

This took place on the 22 of August - that is 30 days ago, and yet there is no sign the PC is proposing another government. If this takes place, then this coup would complement the coup of the GNC to hijack power from the elected HoR.

The illegal HCS has elected a new president. The new president, Mr. Khalid Almeshri. Running dilapidated Libya by remote control without legal approval has already generated a great deal of criticism, and even a criminal investigation by the GNC. On the other hand some analysts say the HoR is only required to grant the vote of confidence to the whole package the actual government of national accord that will be formed by the presidential council.

Others however say the council itself requires a voted approval by the HoR before it can consider itself legal. All in all, no one knows how many violations, years and governments are needed in order to implement the illusive and promised " protection of civilians " initially imposed by the UN in ?

Note One : according to the LPA all the following decrees are illegal because non were agreed upon by all the members of the PC. As noted earlier two members have boycotted the PC right from the start and therefore did not agree to any of the passed decrees. The decrees regarding the military are also illegal because the PC has no constitutional approval and because of Article 8. As of October only fifteen 15 decrees have been published out of decrees issued by the PC to date. The Libyan people should have the right to know what these decrees are about and the PC should publish every one of them in its website.

In fact according the first note they should not issue any decrees at all without unanimous agreement. The so-called salvation government of defunct GNC had already condemned the first decree issued by the GNA on the basis that the GNA has no legitimacy to issue any decrees or laws because the presidential council itself is illegal.

In its strong statement the GNC warned that such actions may lead to civil war [1]. On the other hand the Defence Ministry of the GNC had warned that the GNA's announcement is a criminal offence punishable by law for destabilising the security of the country and accordingly the members involved my be questioned by the relevant authorities. This sounds far worse than when the HoR won the elections and fled to Tobruk. Ali Algatrani [2, 3] who was reported to have said that no voting took place over the committee created by Decree 1 and therefore he complained to the president of the council that he is not happy with the committee that contains members of armed militias; some of whom according to other sources were implicated in war crimes against the Libyan people during the takeover of Tripoli by the "Libya Dawn" militia.

Algatrani said that according to Article 3 of Annex 6 regarding security preparations the committee should be formed from army and police officers [3]. According to Esam Altajouri it is strange that violations of legal matters continue to take place in relation to any solution presented to the crisis in Libya, and that whoever proposed the names of the security committee does not wish the stability of Libya [4] because many of these names are listed by the UN Security Council for violating human rights.

In other words why does the UN continue to create more problems and more visitations that create more discord and more disagreements amongst the Libyans? The decree prohibits all executive and public administrative bodies including ministries, agencies, institutions, boards and commissions from making any changes to the structure or systems or management or its affiliate departments or arrange any financial obligations for the state.

Any such measures will be void after the date of the signing of the political agreement. The decree stresses that the regulatory agencies and the banks of Libya should adhere to the provisions of this decree and reject any requests in violation of this decree.

On naming the ministerial members of the government of national accord comprising 32 ministries see Ministries [above] for more on this.

The other two members who did not sign the decree are deputy prime minister Ali Algatrani who had previously protested against decree 1, as noted above and Mr. Omar Alaswad. Please click here for a larger copy. The presidency council proposed its second government on Sunday the 14th of February However, the HoR's president told Libya's Channel that the HoR did not receive the list until the 15th of February , which is a day after the stipulated deadline.

This second attempt was trimmed down from 32 ministers to 18 ministers 13 ministers and 5 state ministers ; three of whom are women.

  The UN-Imposed Government of National Accord (GNA)

The technical regulation for quantity of product in prepackages. Paints and varnishes. UAE regulation to control hazardous materials in electrical and electronic devices. Environmental mark. Unleaded Gasoline - Requirements and Test Methods. Cabinet Decision No. UAE technical regulation for Vehicle spare parts. Tobacco and Tobacco Products - Dokha. Halal Hospitality HH. Mandatory Standards in Electrical Sector.

Automotive Service Centers Regulation. UAE cabinet resolution No. Technical Requirement for Medical Laboratories Accreditation. Emirates technical regulation for legal measuring instruments No: 16 for Unmanned Aerial Systems Registration. Energy Drinks.

Intellectual property policy. Innovation Policy. Governance Policy. Anti Fraud Policy. Human Resources Governance Policy. From burden to "best buys": reducing the economic impact of non-communicable diseases in low- and middle-income countries. Geneva: World Economic Forum; However, most such countries have not yet included the restriction of TFAs' intake as a policy. Governments have been concerned about the feasibility, achievability and public health effect of removing them from the food supply.

Thus, little is known about the potential effects on the reduction of CHD burden and cost savings that could be attributable to the implementation of TFA-reduction policies in these countries.

From Denmark to Delhi: the multisectoral challenge of regulating trans fats in India.. Public Health Nutr Dec;16 12 PMID are following the Argentine example and are introducing policy and surveillance systems to monitor the content of TFA in foods.

A study modelling a legislative intervention to reduce artificial TFA to 0. Effectiveness and cost effectiveness of cardiovascular disease prevention in whole populations: modelling study. Another modelling study estimated a similar potential impact of this policy in Ireland. Modelling the impact of specific food policy options on coronary heart disease and stroke deaths in Ireland..

BMJ Open ;3 7 :e PMID Unlike these studies, our model is based on individual data on CHD risk from an Argentine population-based sample, calibrated with national statistics, as well as with local data on dietary fat profiles. Moreover, our study is modelling the impact of a policy that is being implemented. Potential limitations of this study should be considered.

First, to calculate CHD risk in Argentina we used a cardiovascular risk calculator. The calculator is based on equations developed a couple of decades ago when the CHD incidence was higher. This could overestimate absolute risk in light of secular trends towards lower CHD risk. Cardiovascular disease mortality in the Americas: current trends and disparities.

On the other hand, these risk equations are widely validated for predicting CHD risk. Overestimation would not likely influence our estimates of proportional risk reduction, since relative risks were calibrated with Argentine absolute risks. Second, we used the global percentage estimates to adjust for underreporting of mortality from CHD. Third, costs of food reformulation by industry were not considered, based on our health system perspective. Yet, potential incremental costs for industry to reduce artificial TFA may be at least partly offset by higher pricing or sales due to marketing advantages.

Fourth, we did not have precise data on baseline TFA, the level of which would influence results. Conversely, our nutritional inputs, particularly those related to the TFA baseline intake before , and the partially hydrogenated vegetable oils' replacements used by the industry thereafter, were obtained after a thorough literature search for sources of TFA in Argentina. This information was reviewed by experts to reach consensus on information gaps to derive a reasonable central estimate and appropriate upper and lower bounds.

In conclusion, our findings suggest that artificial TFA reduction interventions, as an example of a nutritional policy aimed to reach the overall population, have beneficial impact on the total burden of CHD in Argentina. These findings will help inform decision-makers in both Argentina and other countries on the potential public health and economic impact of this policy.

Bulletin of the World Health Organization. Abrir menu. About the authors. Methods We estimated the baseline intake of TFA before to be 1. Conclusion Even under the most conservative scenario, reduction of TFA intake had a substantial effect on public health. Introduction Artificial trans fatty acids TFAs are produced during the industrial processing of vegetable oils. Table 1 Baseline TFA intake and replacements; epidemiological and cost inputs.

Table 2 Cardiovascular disease events, Argentina, PMID Mozaffarian D, Clarke R. Nishida C, Uauy R. Resolution No. Trans fat free Americas: Declaration of Rio de Janeiro. Resolution No and Resolution No Valenzuela BA. Rev Chil Nutr. Gagliardi JCA. Cardiovascular risk calculator [Internet].

Censo [Internet]. Health statistics and information systems. Astrup A. Publication Dates Publication in this collection Sept In any reproduction of this article there should not be any suggestion that WHO or this article endorse any specific organization or products. The use of the WHO logo is not permitted. This notice should be preserved along with the article's original URL.

Correspondence to Adolfo Rubinstein email: arubinstein iecs. Figures 2 Tables 3. Research expert covering the consumer electronics industry. Profit from additional features with an Employee Account. Please create an employee account to be able to mark statistics as favorites. Then you can access your favorite statistics via the star in the header. Profit from additional features by authenticating your Admin account. Then you will be able to mark statistics as favourites and use personal statistics alerts.

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